The sustainability of fiscal deficits has been receiving increasing attention. The issue is paramount for the newly formed euro area and this is one of the motivations of this paper. In order to assess the sustainability of budget deficits, co-integration tests between public expenditures and public revenues, allowing for structural breaks, are performed for the EU countries for the 1970-2003 period. The "unpleasant" empirical results show that with few exceptions fiscal policy may not have been sustainable. EU governments therefore could risk becoming inherently highly indebted, even if the debt-to-GDP ratios seemed to be somehow stabilising at the end of the 1990s. (JEL: H62, H63)
Introduction
In the last two decades several developed countries have experienced significant budget deficits, while the ability of government to cope with fiscal deficits has been receiving increasing attention from economists. This is an important topic both in terms of economics and public policy. The issue is paramount for the newly formed euro area and this is one of the motivations of this paper. Theoretically, equilibrium growth paths need to be supported by adequate fiscal policy.
Furthermore, the Treaties governing the European Union impose the practical necessity of sustainable public accounts. It is possible to assess sustainable public finances in terms of compliance with the budgetary requirements of the European Monetary Union, i.e. avoiding excessive deficits, keeping debt levels below the 60 percent of GDP reference value, and respecting the "close to balance or in surplus" requirement of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). From a forward-looking perspective, one may also notice that the SGP imposes commitments on Member States for budgetary positions in the mediumterm (three to five years) and does not require explicit longer-term targets. Therefore, sustainability is de facto ensured provided budget balances respect the "close to balance or in surplus" target.
Quite a few studies have already addressed the issue of fiscal policy sustainability and provided empirical testing of the Present Value Borrowing Constraint (PVBC) 1 . The main analytical apparatus used to analyse the sustainability of budget deficits are stationarity tests for the stock of public debt and co-integration tests between government expenditures and government revenues. This paper adds to the existing literature by applying unit root and co-integration tests to the EU-15 countries over the period , using consistent public finance data from one single source, the European Commission AMECO database. It also tests for the existence of structural breaks during the time sample in each country. The selected time span includes therefore the run up to
1 Examples of such a growing literature include, for instance, Hamilton and Flavin (1986) , Walsh (1988, 1991) , Kremers (1988 Kremers ( , 1989 , Wilcox (1989) , Hakkio and Rush (1991) , Tanner and Liu (1994) , Quintos (1995) , Haug (1991 Haug ( , 1995 , Ahmed and Rogers (1995) , Payne (1997) , Artis and Marcelino (1998) , Bohn (1998) , Fève and Hénin (2000) , Uctum and Wickens (2000) , and Bravo and Silvestre (2002) .
the introduction of the euro and the efforts, made during the 1990s, by several countries to streamline their public accounts in order to join the common currency. Additionally, both the theoretical and analytical procedures used to assess fiscal sustainability are briefly restated.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section discusses the issue of sustainability.
Section three briefly reviews the analytical framework under which one usually assesses the sustainability of public deficits. Section four presents some stylised facts of fiscal policy for the EU countries. It also reports and discusses the results of the empirical analysis, comprising both stationarity tests and co-integration tests between government expenditures and government revenues for the EU-15 countries, allowing for structural breaks in the series or in the co-integration relationship. Finally, section five provides a conclusion.
The issue of sustainability
Fiscal sustainability seems a recurrent topic that both individual countries and international organisations dwell upon with some regularity 2 . At the beginning of the 1920s, when writing about the public debt problem faced by France, Keynes (1923, p. 24) mentioned the need for the French government to conduct a sustainable fiscal policy in order to satisfy its budget constraint. Keynes stated that the absence of sustainability would be evident when "the State's contractual liabilities (…) have reached an excessive proportion of the national income." In modern terms, sustainability is challenged when the debt-to-GDP ratio reaches an excessive value. There is a problem of sustainability when the government revenues are not enough to keep on financing the costs associated with the new issuance of public debt.
The sustainability of fiscal policy is sometimes associated with the financial solvency of the government. In practice however, what the empirical literature ends up testing is whether both public expenditures and government revenues may continue to display in the future their historical growth patterns. If a given fiscal policy turns out to be 2 See for instance Chalk and Hemming (2000) .
unsustainable, it has to change in order to guarantee that the future primary balances are consistent with the budget constraint 3 . Theoretically any value for the budget deficit would be possible if the government could raise its liabilities without limit. Obviously, that is impossible since the government is faced with the present value of its own budget constraint.
It also is worthwhile noticing that the hypothesis of fiscal policy sustainability is related to the condition that the trajectory of the main macroeconomic variables is not affected by the choice between the issuance of public debt or the increase in taxation. Under such conditions, it would therefore be irrelevant how the deficits are financed, implying also the assumption of the Ricardian Equivalence hypothesis.
The government budget constraint is the starting point to derive the present value of the budget constraint. The flow budget constraint is written as
where G is the government expenditures, excluding interest payments, R is the government revenues, B is the public debt and r is the real interest rate 4 . Rewriting equation ( 
3 Cuddington (1997) and Hénin (1997) discuss this topic. Blanchard et al. (1990) present as a definition of sustainable fiscal policy one that allows, in the short-term, that the debt-to-GDP ratio returns to its original level after some excessive variation. 4 Sometimes in the literature, for the validation of theoretical results, the real interest rate is assumed stationary, but this is a much more difficult assumption for the nominal interest rate.
When the second term from the right-hand side of equation (2) is zero, the present value of the existing stock of public debt will be identical to the present value of future primary surpluses. However, equation (2) is not appropriate for empirical testing. It is therefore useful to make several algebraic modifications to equation (1). Assuming that the real interest rate is stationary, with mean r, and defining 1 ) (
it is possible to obtain the following so-called PVBC:
A sustainable fiscal policy should ensure that the present value of the stock of public debt, the second term of the right hand side of (4), goes to zero in infinity, constraining the debt to grow no faster than the real interest rate. In other words, it implies imposing the absence of Ponzi games and the fulfilment of the intertemporal budget constraint.
Faced with this transversality condition, the government will have to achieve future primary surpluses whose present value adds up to the current value of the stock of public debt. Put another way, public debt in real terms cannot increase indefinitely at a growth rate beyond the real interest rate 5 .
It is also possible to derive the solvency condition, with all the variables defined as a percentage of GDP 6 . The PVBC, with the variables expressed as ratios of GDP, with y being the GDP real growth rate, and neglecting for presentation purposes seigniorage revenues, is then written as 5 See Joines (1991) . McCallum (1984) discusses if this is a necessary condition to obtain an optimal growth trajectory for the stock of public debt. 6 For instance Hakkio and Rush (1991, p. 430) support that an analysis based on ratios is more appropriated for growing economies: "in addition to examining revenue and spending directly, we also use [to] normalize these variables using real GNP and population. This is an important extension beyond previous work since McCallum [1984] , among others, deems these ratios -per capita spending and revenue, and spending and revenue as a fraction of GNP -as more pertinent for a growing economy." 
Assessment of the sustainability of public deficits
A common practice in the literature, among the set of methods to evaluate fiscal policy sustainability, is to investigate past fiscal data to see if government debt follows a stationary process or to establish if there is co-integration between government revenues and government expenditures 9 .
Recalling the PVBC, equation (4), it is possible to present analytically two complementary definitions of sustainability that set the background for empirical testing:
i) The value of public current debt must be equal to the sum of future primary surpluses:
7 This implies that the growth rate of the debt-to-GDP ratio should be less than the factor ( )
According to Buiter (2002) , the intertemporal government budget constraint should be satisfied always and not only in equilibrium. This is Buiter's main criticism of the fiscal theory of price level. 9 Hamilton and Flavin (1986) first used these procedures. See also Trehan and Walsh (1991) and Hakkio and Rush (1991) .
ii) The present value of public debt must approach zero in infinity:
In order to test empirically the absence of Ponzi games, one can test the stationarity of the first difference of the stock of public debt, using unit root tests developed by Dickey and Fuller (1981) and by Phillips and Perron (1988) .
It is also possible to assess fiscal policy sustainability through co-integration tests. The implicit hypothesis concerning the real interest rate, with mean r, is also stationarity.
Using again the auxiliary variable 1 ) (
, and the additional definition
, the intertemporal budget constraint may also be written as
and with the no-Ponzi game condition, GG t and R t must be co-integrated variables of order one for their first differences to be stationary.
Assuming that R and E are non-stationary variables, and that the first differences are stationary variables, this implies that the series R and E in levels are I (1). Then, for equation (9) to hold, its left-hand side will also have to be also stationary. If it is possible to conclude that GG and R are integrated of order 1, these two variables should be cointegrated with co-integration vector (1, -1), for the left-hand side of equation (9) to be stationary.
Therefore the procedure to assess the sustainability of the intertemporal government budget constraint involves testing the following co-integration regression:
. If the null of no co-integration, the hypothesis that the two I (1) variables are not co-integrated, is rejected (with a high-test statistic), this implies that one should accept the alternative hypothesis of co-integration. For that result to hold true, the series of the residual u t must be stationary, and should not display a unit root. Several conclusions concerning the intertemporal budget constraint may then be established:
i) When there is no co-integration, the fiscal deficit is not sustainable, ii) When there is co-integration with b=1, the deficit is sustainable, iii) When there is co-integration, with b < 1, government expenditures grow faster than government revenues, and the deficit may not be sustainable 10 .
Hakkio and Rush (1991) also demonstrate that if GG and R are non-stationary variables in levels, the condition 0 < b < 1 is a sufficient condition for the budget constraint to be Before proceeding it seems adequate to close the present section by summarising the empirical findings of several previous studies, concerning the issue of sustainability.
Therefore, Table 1 reviews the conclusions of those papers, which cover basically the US and European countries, with sometimes quite conflicting results.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Fiscal policy sustainability in the EU-15 area
This section includes some stylised facts on fiscal policy during the 1970-2003 period for the EU-15 countries. It also reports the unit root tests and estimation results of cointegrating relations between expenditures and revenues.
Some stylised facts
A brief characterisation of the debt and fiscal burden for the EU countries is appropriate before performing the empirical testing of the sustainability hypothesis. Between the beginning of the 1970s and the end of the 1990s the debt-to-GDP ratio exhibited an increasing trend for most countries throughout the period. three countries still had a debt-to-GDP ratio above 100 percent (Italy, Belgium and Greece), while in three other countries the debt ratio was higher than 60 percent (Austria, Germany and France).
In the period 1970-2003 the highest debt-to-GDP ratios were reported in Italy and Belgium (the country with the highest debt-to-GDP ratio in that period; reaching 138.2 percent in 1993), and their high debt service payments induced substantial budget deficits despite primary budget surpluses. A reversal of that general trend is noticeable only at the end of the 1990s, as the several "more indebted" countries tried to fulfil or at least come closer to the Maastricht debt criterion.
The consequences of choosing different fiscal policies may be exemplified by looking for instance at the public debt paths of some of the EU countries, as depicted in Figure 2 . For instance, the adding up of successive and significant budget deficits in Italy and in Belgium had a clearly identifiable impact on government debt, with the debt-to-GDP ratio rising steadily until the middle of the 1990s. Germany and France also exhibited a slowly growing debt ratio throughout the 1980s and 1990s. On the other hand, debt ratio at the UK followed a downward path, while Ireland changed from being a high debt country in the 1980s to a "less indebted" country in the 1990s.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
Concerning government expenditures and revenues, Table 2 reports those items as a percentage of GDP for each country. The main conclusion is that the burden of public expenditures and revenues on GDP has increased since the 1970s in almost every country. Another obvious fact is that, , between 1970 and 2003, the ratio of government expenditures to GDP, for most countries, exhibited a higher growth rate than the ratio of government revenues to GDP. This conclusion holds for all countries except for Belgium, Ireland and Italy. For instance in Italy, the ratios of government revenues and expenditures to GDP were respectively 29 and 32.6 percent in 1970, compared with 45.9
and 48.5 percent in 2003.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Estimation results for the debt series
The focus of this sub-section and the next, is the study of fiscal policy sustainability for each of the EU-15 countries. Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests are used in an attempt to validate the sufficient sustainability condition, using the stock of real public debt. Table 3 reports the stationarity tests results for the first difference of the stock of public debt, at 1995 prices, for the period 1970-2003 (see data sources in the Annex), considering both a constant and no trend.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
The results allow the rejection of the null of a unit root for Austria, Portugal and the UK, according to ADF tests, and for France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain and Sweden, using the PP tests. Therefore the series of the first difference of public debt might be I (0) for some countries, and the solvency condition would be satisfied in those cases. However, if one considers also a time trend, then neither the ADF nor the PP tests report that any of the series is I (0).
The previous results assume that there is no structural break in the debt series. However, this might not be the case in some countries, namely for Germany due to reunification in 1990. 12 In the presence of structural changes in the trend function, ADF and PP tests that do not take account of the break in the series have low power and are biased toward the non-rejection of a unit root. One procedure to test for unit roots in the presence of a structural break involves splitting the sample into two parts and using the unit root tests for each part. However, a resulting problem is that the degrees of freedom are diminished for each of the parts.
Therefore, following Zivot and Andrews' (1992) recursive approach, we tested the null hypothesis that the series have a unit root against the alternative of stationarity with structural change at some unknown break date denoted by T B . 13 The break date is chosen endogenously as the value, over all possible break points, 14 which minimises the tstatistic for testing r=1 in the following regression:
. (10) The shift in the trend is given by DT t = t-T B , if t > T B , and 0 otherwise, and the shift in the mean by DU t =1 if t > T B , and 0 otherwise. T B equals one at the observation after the break point, while the additional one-time dummy D(T B ) t =1 if t=T B +1 and 0 otherwise. This "innovational outlier" model specifies that the change to the new trend function is gradual. Perron (1988) , with the advantage that the break point is estimated rather than fixed exogenously. See, for instance, Hansen (2001) for a review of these issues. 14 Zivot and Andrews (1992) suggest estimating the autoregressions in some interval that excludes break dates near the beginning or the end of the sample.
(1992) and by Perron (1994) for the best-fitted regression, alongside the estimated break dates.
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[Insert Table 4 about here]
The results allow for the rejection of the unit root hypothesis for Austria, Finland and the UK, using the Zivot and Andrews test statistic, for Finland, Germany, Sweden and the UK when the Perron test statistic is used. However, in general one cannot reject the unitroot null at the 5 percent or 10 percent level, implying that there is not much evidence against the unit-root hypothesis for most of the debt series in the EU-15 countries. These results are, to some extent, in line with the standard unit-root tests reported previously in Table 3 .
Since some debt series might be stationary with breaks, the selected value of TB is a consistent estimate of the break point. Interestingly, most of the reported breaks seem to cluster in the 1990s, and more specifically in the first half of the decade, namely Austria in 1991/92, Finland in 1990/91, and Germany in 1993/94. One can also notice that, for instance, in Finland the debt-to-GDP ratio increased by more than threefold between 1990 and 1992 (while there was a severe recession in 1991/92). On the other hand, the estimated break date for Germany occurs only in 1993.
One should also notice that the number of observations used is only 33 at most, and the accuracy problems of unit root tests with small samples are well known. However, the alternative approach of using quarterly data would constrain the time period, so that it is therefore preferable to use a longer sample of annual data, instead of more observations along a smaller time span. Furthermore, the rejection of the stationarity hypothesis does not mean, as already noticed above, that public accounts are not sustainable, since as Trehan and Walsh (1991) observe, the stationarity of the variation of the stock of public debt is a sufficient condition, and stationarity rejection does not necessarily imply the absence of sustainability in the government accounts.
Co-integration results
We now proceed to study fiscal sustainability in the EU-15 countries by testing the existence of co-integration between government expenditures and revenues, taken as a percentage of GDP, and using the sequential procedure depicted in Figure 1 The first step is then to test the existence of a unit root for the government expenditures and revenues as a percentage of GDP and to assess whether they are best characterised as I(0) or as I(1) series. The results of those tests for the series in levels are presented in Table 5 .
[Insert Table 5 about here] It is possible to conclude that almost all series are not stationary in levels. There are some exceptions where the ADF test statistic does not allow rejecting the hypothesis that the series are I (0). However, this never happened with the PP test statistic, and allowing for a trend in the regressions, both the ADF and the PP tests report that all series are nonstationary. For every country it is thus necessary to test for the stationarity of the first differences of the series.
According to the results also reported in Table 5 , in general one would not reject the stationarity of the first differences of the government expenditures and revenues series. This is true for all series according to the PP test, but less generalised under the ADF test statistics results. One can then tentatively assume that the first difference of the original series is I (0), which means that the series in levels are I (1).
The Engle-Granger and Johansen co-integration tests were subsequently performed with the government revenues and expenditures as a percentage of GDP. Co-integration tests were made for all countries, even for the countries where the ADF test statistic (but not the PP test) allows rejecting the null of unit root for the first difference of the revenue and expenditure series. The co-integration results are presented in Table 6 , but only for the cases where there is a co-integrating vector with at least a significance level of ten percent.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
The test results allow the rejection of the co-integration hypothesis for the majority of the countries, except for Austria, Germany, Finland, Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom. However, the estimated coefficients for expenditures, in the co-integration equations, where government revenues are the dependent variable, are always less than one. As a matter of fact, for each one percentage point of GDP increase in public expenditures, for instance in the Netherlands and in Germany, public revenues only increase respectively by 0.634 and 0.521 percentage points of GDP. Notice that these two countries are the ones where the estimated coefficient b in the co-integrating vector (1, -b) has the highest absolute value. For the other countries where a significant cointegration vector was found, b is even lower in absolute value.
In other words, for the period 1970-2003, government expenditures in the abovementioned countries exhibited a higher growth rate than public revenues, challenging therefore the hypothesis of fiscal policy sustainability. These results suggest that fiscal policy may not have been sustainable for most countries with the possible exceptions of Germany and the Netherlands.
However, and as in the case of unit roots, a test for co-integration that does not take into account possible breaks in the long-run relationship will have lower power. The test will tend to under-reject the null of no co-integration if there is a co-integration relationship that has changed at some time during the sample period. Therefore, to further evaluate the previous results, one should also entertain the possibility that the series are co-integrated but that the linear combination has shifted at an unknown point in the data sample, in other words, that there might be a relevant break date. Following Gregory and Hansen (1996) , the hypothesis of a structural shift in the co-integration relationships was then studied.
16 Table 7 reports the results of the tests for regime shift (in level, with a time trend) in co-integration of government revenues and expenditures for the EU-15 countries.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
It is possible to see that for the above-mentioned countries, where a co-integration vector was found, the test statistics from Table 7 broadly support the previous findings. Indeed, accounting for the existence of break dates, the null of no co-integration is now rejected for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Portugal and the UK, with the ADF test statistic results (with the Phillips Z a * test statistic the null is only rejected for Belgium). This means that there is some long-run relationship in the data for those countries. Notice also that the null of no co-integration is no longer rejected for Germany.
Additionally, the fact that the null hypothesis is now rejected for Belgium implies that structural changes in the co-integration vector may be important. Since for the remainder of the countries both ADF and ADF * test statistics reject the null of no co-integration, no inference that structural change has occurred is warranted.
Our results, as most of the results reported in the literature were obtained without considering additional sources of government revenues: for instance seigniorage and privatisation revenues. Information on privatisation revenues is not easily available for the EU-15 countries. Additionally, government assets (wealth) should be taken into account to make judgements about the sustainability of public finances (even though data are mostly lacking).
Conclusion
The fiscal policy sustainability issue has been reviewed and discussed in this paper, using the government budget constraint as the key element of the analysis, and also the starting point to derive analytical formulations suitable for empirical testing. Formally, the PVBC requires that all future net tax revenues (i.e. tax revenues less transfers of current and all future generations measured in present value terms) are enough to cover the present value of future government consumption and to service the existing stock of government debt 17 .
The paper's results reveal that with few exceptions, EU governments might have sustainability problems, although debt-to-GDP ratios showed signs of stabilising at the end of the 1990s. Using government expenditures and revenues as a percentage of GDP, a co-integration approach was adopted. However, and even if a co-integration vector were identified for Austria, Germany, Finland, Netherlands and Portugal, the estimated coefficients for expenditures in the co-integration equations for those countries, where public revenues is the dependent variable, are less than one.
The results of this paper are comparable with the ones from some of the existing crosscountry literature, and might be considered as "unpleasant" from a policy maker's point of view 18 . A small number of countries emerge as less likely to exhibit sustainability problems, namely Germany, Netherlands, Finland, Austria the UK. Of these, Germany and the Netherlands almost always appear as less likely to have sustainability problems.
However, our results also show that even for those two countries, the absolute value of the relevant estimated coefficient in the co-integration relation is quite below unity implying that their budget deficits may not be sustainable.
Therefore, the aforementioned countries face the problem of having a higher growth rate for expenditures than the growth rate of revenues. In other words, if fiscal policy were to be conducted in the future as it was in the past, there could still be some problems ahead, even for this set of countries that started, early in the 1990s, to make efforts in order to meet strict budgetary criteria. This problem may even become more critical in the light of some "unpleasant" available projections for the EU-15 countries, concerning future public financial responsibilities. As a matter of fact, the EC (2001) It is nevertheless important to keep in mind that the main driver for budgetary problems in developed countries during future decades will be population growth combined with generous pay-as-you-go financed social security systems. Since this population shift towards older societies is an entirely new phenomenon, it cannot be considered in econometric results based exclusively on past data. This does not constitute a general criticism against purely econometric methods of measuring fiscal sustainability, but is instead an argument for expanding the database. Indeed, implicit public pension liabilities, as part of a country's global fiscal imbalance, have to be understood as future borrowing requirements, not fully embedded in the public fiscal figures, leading therefore to added sustainability problems 19 . Also, one must recall that even for some of the countries that are identified as not having had in the past an unsustainable policy, other reports claim that sustainability may not be a feature of such countries' fiscal policies 20 .
Annex: Data sources
All data was taken from the European Commission AMECO (Annual Macro-Economic Data) database, updated on 07/01/2004. The relevant AMECO codes are reported below.
-General government public debt (national currency). Code: UDGGL (linked series).
-Price deflator private of final consumption expenditure. Code: PCPH.
-General government total revenues, national currency. Code: URTG (ESA 1995); URTGF (former definition).
-General government total expenditures, national currency. Code: UUTG (ESA 1995); UUTGF (former definition).
-Gross domestic product, at market prices. Code: UVGDH (ESA 1995); UVGD (former definition). 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. Unit root tests were not carried out for Luxembourg since there were no data available in the AMECO database between 1988 and 1994. Some consistency in the asterisk signals for the significance levels may be lost due to rounding. Notes: The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. Only co-integrating vectors with at least a 10% significance level are reported. Notes: ADF * and Z a * refer to the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and to the Phillips Z a * test statistics. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively, using the critical values from Gregory and Hansen (1996, 
